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Risk Communication, the Hanford Thyroid
Disease Study and Draft Reports
Sharon M. Friedman*
Introduction
Presenting the public with information about complex and
controversial scientific questions that have health ramifications offers
risk communication some of its greatest challenges. This task is made
even more difficult when a draft, rather than a final, report of scientific
findings is released to the public by a government agency, scientific
organization or university before the report has undergone peer review.
In particular, government agencies appear to be releasing more
controversial draft reports than in the past (for example, the June 2000
release of the Environmental Protection Agency's draft final report on
dioxin).' These draft reports present a number of complicated risk
communication headaches for the government agency, the scientists
involved, the reviewers to come, journalists and the public.
This paper reviews the problem-laden release of a draft final report
in 1999 of a nine-year, $18 million study by the Fred Hutchinson
Cancer Research Center (FHCRC), done under contract for the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Some significant
risk communication problems occurred with the release of the Hanford
Thyroid Disease Study (HTDS) Draft Final Report, 2 despite the
presence of a communication plan, a public advisory committee, a web
site and an open information policy throughout the nine years of the
study.
* Sharon M. Friedman is Professor and Director of the Science and Environmental Writing
Program in the Department of Journalism and Communication at Lehigh University in
Bethlehem, PA. She has degrees in biology and journalism from Temple and Pennsylvania
Universities. She was a member of the National Academy of Sciences - National Research
Council committee that reviewed the Hanford Thyroid Disease Study Draft Final Report. E-
mail: smf6@lehigh.edu.
I Environmental Protection Agency, Dioxin Reassessment Draft Documents (Sept. 2000),
at www.epa.gov/ncea/pdfs/dioxin/dioxreass.htm.
2 Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, Hanford Thyroid Disease Draft Final Report
(Jan. 1999).
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Because of the controversial nature of the draft final report, risk
communication problems even occurred for the committee established
by the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council
(NAS-NRC) to review the HTDS draft report, both as this committee
did its own evaluation and with the release of its review. 3 This paper
summarizes the risk communication sections of the book-length NAS-
NRC committee review, which I wrote. It paraphrases and occasionally
quotes from these sections without further citation. The references in
this paper are to the original sources used for the NAS-NRC review.
Background on the HTDS
In 1986, the U.S. Department of Energy revealed that the Hanford
Atomic Products Operations in Richland, WA, had been releasing
radioactive material, in particular, radioactive iodine (1-131) into the
environment over a period of years. Citizens of the region were
concerned about whether Hanford releases of 1-131 had led to an
increase in thyroid disease in the people who lived in the area. Two
years later, the U.S. Congress ordered a study by the CDC of the
human health effects of exposure to 1-131 released from Hanford.
The HTDS was extensive, contacting close to 5,200 people who
had been born near Hanford in the period of 1940-1946. This time
period was chosen because the period of greatest radiation release from
the Hanford plant was 1944-47. Eventually, 3,441 people were enrolled
in the study, given thorough medical exams to look for evidence of
thyroid disease and questioned extensively about risk factors for
thyroid disease. The investigators were able to estimate individual risk
exposures for 3,190 of them.
As can be imagined, estimating radiation exposures of 50 years ago
was a daunting task because of the many unknowns about people's lives,
habits and diet. To help accomplish this, a complex statistical method
devised previously by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory was
used to estimate the exposure received by each HTDS participant.
Using rates of thyroid disease found among the participants and
estimates of radiation exposure, the FHCRC investigators employed
3 Committee on an Assessment of Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Radiation
Studies from DOE Contractor Sites: Subcommittee to Review the Hanford Thyroid Disease
Study, Review of the Hanford Thyroid Disease Study Draft Final Report (2000).
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statistical methods to determine whether there was a relationship
between the rates of disease found and the estimated radiation
exposures.
Announcing the Findings of the Draft Final Report
On January 28, 1999, the FHCRC investigators and the CDC
released a draft final report of the study to the public. This draft had
undergone internal review by CDC personnel and a few consultants,
but it still had to be reviewed by the NAS-NRC committee. The prime
finding of the draft final report was that there was no evidence linking
radiation exposure from Hanford to the rate of thyroid disease found
in the study population.
This negative finding upset many citizens of the region as did the
way the information was released. Many residents, including some who
were members of the study's advisory committee, thought the
FHCRC investigators overstated the certainty of their results while
presenting their findings to the media and the public. Here are a few
examples of what the investigators said (emphasis added):
* Findings of the Hanford Thyroid Disease Study are clear
and unequivocal.4
* This was a very powerful study because it included a large
number of people estimated to have a wide range of
exposures to 1-131. 5
* The design and successful completion of the study ensured
a very high probability of detecting relationships between
Hanford radiation dose and diseases under study if such
relationships exist. The study was very powerful because
6
* The study had sufficient statistical power to detect
increases in thyroid disease risk that were predicted based
on studies in other populations.7
4 See Scott Davis, Kenneth Kopecky & Thomas Hamilton, Letter to the Editor, Findings
of Study 'Clear and Unequivocal,'Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Mar. 14, 1999.
5 See Press Release, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Draft Report: Results of
the Hanford Thyroid Disease Study (Jan. 28, 1999) (quoting Scott Davis).
6 See Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, Questions and Answers about the HTDS
Results, HTDS Newsletter (Jan. 1999).
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Because of the public furor in the Hanford region concerning the
release of the draft report, CDC personnel added three communication
questions to three scientific ones they had originally asked the NAS-
NRC committee to answer about the HTDS draft report. First, was
the material accurate and appropriate in providing guidance to the
public in understanding the study findings? Second, if these messages
needed to be amended, how should the revised messages best be
communicated to the public? Third, with regard to release of future
study reports, how can the CDC improve the public communication
process?
As the designated risk communication person on the NAS-NRC
committee, I worked with another committee member, Susan E.
Lederer, a medical historian at Yale University, to answer these
questions. We did this by seeking to reconstruct the situations that had
led up to the release of the draft report, the manner in which it was
released and the public response to it. To gather information, we
interviewed one of the principal FHCRC investigators, six members of
the communication and scientific staffs at the CDC, some citizen
advisory group members and several regional journalists. We also heard
from scientists, state and tribal nation officials and members of the
public during a public meeting held by the NAS-NRC committee,
which will be discussed later. We reviewed scientific, communication
and planning documents related to the draft report and viewed past
newspaper articles and citizen group web sites about the HTDS.
We found a number of communication problems with releasing the
draft report, which was ironic, considering the openness and quality of
the risk communication programming that had gone on during the nine
years of the study. Communication efforts had included developing
fact sheets, brochures, newsletters and a web site for the public and
having a toll-free telephone number available. Special arrangements
were made to let study participants know about the results of their
clinical evaluation for thyroid disease. Communication with a federally
appointed HTDS Advisory Committee was generally good for the
length of the study, according to some of its members, as were relations
7 See Congressional Briefing Document on Hanford Thyroid Disease Study, Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, Summary of the Study and the Primary Findings (Jan. 27,
1999).
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with various other citizen groups including the Hanford Health
Information Network and the Hanford Health Effects Subcommittee.
In fact, before the release of the draft final report, there were few
complaints about communication issues related to the study.
Risk Communication Issues with the Release of the Draft Report
Some of the risk communication problems found with the report's
release were generic to government draft reports in general and others
were specific to the HTDS report. One generic issue concerned the
audiences involved. There were many of them and they formed a fine
example of what Krimsky and Plough have called the tangled web of
risk communication. 8 Regionally, they included three state
governments and representatives of nine Native American nations; four
major citizen groups plus some smaller ones; journalists; lawyers,
litigants, consultants and potential expert witnesses for a class-action
lawsuit; and many individuals in the region who themselves had or had
family members who had some type of thyroid disease. Because of the
secrecy about these radiation releases for many years, a number of
citizens in the region said they were distrustful of the Department of
Energy in particular and the federal government in general.
A major problem specific to the HTDS was that the
communication plan described in the draft report was designed for a
final report, not a draft.9 As with the communication efforts carried
out during the length of the study, this plan was basically sound and
aimed at getting understandable information to the public. It called for
widespread distribution of a public summary and briefings by satellite
of the various state agencies and citizen groups involved, among more
standard media and public release strategies. This plan was approved by
the HTDS Advisory Committee and widely disseminated in the
HTDS newsletter. Unfortunately, it did not appear to be very flexible
so that it could be implemented within a short timeframe and under
different conditions.
A need to quickly issue a draft report acted as the main driver for
the risk communication problems encountered, and three major factors
8 See Sheldon Krimsky & Alonzo Plough, Environmental Hazards (1988).
9 Telephone Interview with Scott Davis, Principal Investigator, Hanford Thyroid Disease
Study (July 2, 1999).
12 Risk- Health, Safety & Environment 91 [Spring 2001]
interacted to bring this need about. First, there were numerous written
requests to the director of the CDC's National Center for
Environmental Health to make public the FHCRC draft turned over to
the CDC on September 30, 1998. Some members of the public feared
that the CDC's internal review would alter the FHCRC investigators'
findings. Such fear is not surprising, given the distrust of federal
government agencies prevalent in the area. Since these written messages
to the director were received in early October, CDC officials said they
interpreted the requests to mean the report should be made available to
the public unchanged. Citizen demands to the CDC to release the
report and not change it were exemplified in the minutes of a Hanford
Health Effects Subcommittee meeting held in December 1998, where
an individual at the meeting noted that "...if there are changes made
between what Fred Hutchinson delivers and what comes out the door
at CDC, I'm hoping that you have heard from this subcommittee
clearly that we want to know what those changes were and the rationale
for those changes." 10
The second factor was that the NAS-NRC said that the credibility
of its review would be compromised if the HTDS report were not
publicly available when the review process began. After this
communication, CDC and FHCRC officials decided on November
12, 1998 to release a draft final report at the end of January 1999.
Reinforcing this decision was the third factor: a subpoena delivered
during the week of November 16 from one party in a Hanford class
action lawsuit that wanted release of the draft report within 30 days.
Since a decision to release the report in January had already been made,
the plaintiffs' attorneys, with the consent of the court, indicated they
could wait until then.
The draft report was not released before January 1999 because of
the need to write an understandable public summary. To help make the
public summary as clear and effective as possible, the FHCRC
investigators involved several focus groups, trying out various
approaches to explaining very complicated technical information. 11
10 Transcript Excerpts, Hanford Health Effects Subcommittee Meeting, Salt Lake City,
Utah (December 10-11, 1999).
11 Davis interview, supra note 9.
Friedman: Hanford Thyroid Disease Study 97
Releasing a report with this type of import is not a simple task.
Neither the investigators nor the CDC took it lightly. However, the
relatively quick release of the draft report exacerbated some of the
communication problems because there was not much time to work out
details, particularly with the intervening Christmas and New Year
holidays, according to one of the FHCRC investigators. 12 In
preparing for the release, additional federal officials and clearances now
came into the picture and took a high priority-another generic feature
when releasing draft government reports. Besides those in the CDC,
officials in the Department of Health and Human Services, the
Department of Energy, the National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health, and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
as well as congressional delegations from Washington, Idaho and
Oregon all needed to be briefed. Clearances for the draft report
through many government channels were put on a fast track and only
took about two weeks, according to CDC personnel. But while these
clearances and federal government briefings were occurring, officials
imposed an information blackout about the report, and this led to a
number of problems.
The blackout was imposed, according to CDC personnel, so that
study participants and the public would know the results at the same
time. However, this was an unrealistic hope, given the numbers of
government groups that had to be briefed before the official public
release. The more briefings scheduled ahead of an official release date
and time, the greater the chance the report's findings will be leaked.
(This is another generic problem with releasing draft government
reports also exemplified by the leak of the results of the dioxin draft
final report to The Washington Post in May 2000, one month before
its release date.13)
As could have been predicted, the HTDS draft report's findings
were leaked. The New York Times ran the story on January 27,
1999,14 which was then carried by the Associated Press wire service
12 Id.
13 Cindy Skrzycki & Joby Warrick, EPA Links Dioxin to Cancer: Risk Estimate Raised
Tenfold, Wash. Post, May 17, 2000, at Al.
14 Matthew L. Wald, No Radiation Effect Found at Northwest Nuclear Site, N.Y. Times,
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and seen by reporters in the Hanford area about 8 p.m. that night. It
was early enough, said one reporter, that she was able to add some local
reaction about the findings to a story she had been writing about the
release of the report the next day. Her newspaper also ran The New
York Times story on the morning of January 28, before the official
release of the draft report. 15 The leak sent reporters, CDC and
FHCRC officials scrambling. CDC personnel said they started to fax
materials about the study's results to reporters at 6 a.m. EST on January
28, 1999, not waiting for the morning set of briefings for state health
officers and the Northwest Tribal Nations and Indian Health Service,
or the 1 p.m. briefing for four citizen groups. They also did not wait for
the media briefing scheduled at 3 p.m. or the public briefing at 7 p.m.
They began putting all of the draft report's findings on the web site at 3
a.m. EST, twelve hours ahead of schedule.
Besides contributing to the press leak, the blackout had an unhappy
effect on the citizen groups that had been cooperating with the study,
in particular, the HTDS Advisory Committee. Used to being informed
about what was happening in the study, members were told in
December 1998 that they would not be briefed about the study's
findings until two hours before the media briefing. They were not
happy with this schedule, which was followed even after the media leak.
It caused serious problems for the citizen group representatives when
reporters called earlier that day to ask them about a report they had
neither seen nor been briefed on.
Even without the press leak, the regional briefings were a problem.
Instead of the proposed satellite briefings in the original
communication plan, conference calls were used to brief the tri-state
health and tribal nation officials and the four citizen groups. These
satisfied no one. One of the FHCRC investigators complained that
these calls were too impersonal and unwieldy. He did not know who
was on the other end; he could not show graphs or other illustrations,
and he could only deliver an abbreviated version of the information that
would be presented at the media and public briefings later in the
day. 16 People on the receiving end of the briefings complained that
Jan. 27, 1999, at A20.
15 Telephone Interview with Annette Cary, Staff Writer, Tri-City Herald (June 30, 1999).
16 Davis interview, supra note 9.
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they heard a message they had not expected, had few details, had
nothing in writing and could only ask general questions.
Perhaps all of these communication problems could have turned out
to be relatively minor had major mistakes not occurred at the media
and public briefings later that day. During these briefings, the FHCRC
investigators presented an upbeat and very confident interpretation of
their findings (exemplified by some of the statements cited earlier)
with few, if any, qualifiers about statistical and other uncertainties that
were in the study.17 In fact, the investigators were in the middle of
conducting an uncertainty analysis, which was not working, when they
released the draft report's findings. One of the investigators said that he
did not discuss the uncertainties because they were technical and the
focus groups held during the fall had said not to convey any technical
information in the public materials. 18
One reporter at both the media and public briefings was surprised
by "how absolutely confident the Hutch [FHCRC] people were." She
pointed out that subtleties and uncertainties were not discussed, nor
were any problems with statistical power. She noted that scientists
usually are not that positive about their studies and often make
"conditional statements particularly when a study is still a draft and
hasn't undergone peer review."' 19
However, another reporter who attended the media briefing said
that even if the uncertainties in the study had been stressed, the media
probably would not have emphasized them. She noted that the press
"wouldn't have dwelt on the uncertainties" because the media,
particularly broadcast media, do not go into all the technical details.
She said that they would report only that "the bottom line is this.
That's the way the media operate." 20
17 The media and public briefings were not taped by the CDC or FHCRC. Therefore there
were no transcripts to review exactly what was said. Reports of what went on at these briefings
were obtained through interviews with FHCRC and CDC personnel, citizen group members
and journalists who attended.
18 Davis interview, supra note 9.
19 Telephone Interview with Karen Dorn Steele, Staff Writer, The Spokesman-Review (June
30, 1999).
20 Cary interview, supra note 15.
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It is hard not to question whether the public dismay with the
report's release would still have come about if the message had been
different. The main message - no link between radiation exposure and
prevalence of thyroid disease - was not expected by most people in
the region. Given previous positive findings of the Nevada Test Site,
Chernobyl and other radiation exposure studies and the documented
radiation releases from Hanford, a positive association was expected,
according to local journalists and some citizens.
In this situation, with an audience very concerned about perceived
high rates of thyroid disease in the population - an audience reported
to have little trust in government agencies - great care should have
been taken to deliver the HTDS results sensitively and tactfully.
Delivering unpopular risk messages is itself risky. It has to be done
delicately, with careful thought about how it will affect an audience
expecting an opposite result. Varied audience responses have to be
evaluated and planned for. Sensitivity needs to be shown to audience
health concerns and fears. For the HTDS draft report, implications for
individuals and families who had suffered from thyroid disease should
not only have been explained but also highlighted. Instead the FHCRC
investigators said that people in the region should be relieved that no
link had been found between the releases and thyroid disease. They
emphasized the statistical group effect, not the outcome for individuals.
Several months later in early May 1999, when the CDC held two
poorly attended public meetings on the draft final report, it softened
the tone of the message about the results, saying that there may be
individuals in the overall population at Hanford who were exposed to
radiation and did develop thyroid disease because of their exposure.2 1
In the public outcry that followed the January 28 release of the
draft final report, many people asked why the CDC had not acted
earlier to modify the overly positive tone of the investigators in both the
draft report and the briefings. Some people in the region said that the
FHCRC investigators were contractors and that the CDC was
ultimately responsible for what was said about the study. They charged
that the CDC had done a disservice to the people of the region. This is
an important and complex question that involves agency-contractor
21 See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Summary of the Preliminary Results
The Hanford Thyroid Disease Study Draft Final Report (May 1999).
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relations, academic freedom and responsibilities to the public. It
becomes even more complicated if one remembers that in October and
again in December 1998, citizens had urged the CDC not to alter the
report as it came from the investigators. If CDC officials had requested
a modified tone about the findings, they could have been accused of
altering the FHCRC investigators report, said one CDC staff member.
CDC officials said that the main message was decided by
collaboration between them and the FHCRC investigators after a
number of discussions. Several CDC staff members noted that they
had concerns that some of the messages were too strong, but after
struggling with some of the language, decided to leave it as drafted by
the investigators because of public pressure not to alter the report.
Despite some sensitivity to problems with language in the draft
report, CDC personnel also showed some insensitivity to people and
families with thyroid disease when they announced at the public
briefing on January 28 that they would recommend a change in plans
for medical monitoring of people in the region. No matter what reasons
officials gave - including a report by the Institute of Medicine
questioning the value of medical monitoring - the public linked this
action to the announced results of the HTDS. And although the CDC
took pains to point out to the public and the media that the HTDS
report was a draft and would undergo peer and public review, the
agency appeared to be basing policy decisions on it already. Even if the
decision regarding medical monitoring was correct, discussing it at the
same time that the HTDS draft final report was released was a mistake
that hurt the CDC's credibility.
Risk Communication and the NAS-NRC Review Committee's Report
As mentioned earlier, evaluating the HTDS draft report also
created risk communication problems for the NAS-NRC committee. It
immediately found itself being criticized by citizen groups for holding
its initial meetings in Atlanta and Augusta, rather than in Washington
State. Concerned about its own credibility with both the scientific
community and lay persons, particularly citizens in the Hanford region,
the committee worked with selected members of the citizen groups and
scheduled an open meeting in Spokane in June 1999 to hear all sides -
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both scientific and public - concerning what was in the report itself
and the manner in which the draft report had been released.
There was widespread notification about the public meeting to
interested persons, citizen groups and government officials in three
states. The meeting itself was structured to solicit comments from
technical experts and laypersons on four specific and very contentious
topics: thyroid dosimetry and uncertainty; other evidence and
contextual information related to Hanford exposures; statistical power
and study design; and communication. There were fourteen invited
presentations for the four sessions, with each topic discussed for at least
an hour, with an additional half-hour for public comment. These
sessions were followed by an open-microphone period where anyone
could bring any topic to the committee's attention. Those attending
the meeting were encouraged to make oral statements and to provide
written questions and comments to the committee. Written
submissions from those who could not attend the meeting also were
invited. (In its report, the NAS-NRC committee included an appendix
that responded to selected comments made by the public at this
meeting.) Sixty people from three states came to the meeting,
including members of the press.
When, after nine months of review and writing, the NAS-NRC
committee's report was ready for release, the committee tried not to
get entangled in the same risk communication problems that had
plagued the HTDS draft report. Believing that the public was the prime
audience to hear its findings, the committee only held one advanced
briefing for a small number of CDC staff members before the day of
the report's release. Members of the congressional delegations were
briefed on the same day as the public.
There was widespread notification in the Hanford region about a
combined public and media briefing to release the report including
articles in the major newspapers plus advertisements inviting people to
attend. Three members of the NAS-NRC committee traveled to
Spokane to release the report and answer questions from the media and
the public at the briefing. Reporters from other locations could listen to
the briefing, call in questions and then later interview the committee
members by phone. The NAS-NRC also issued a news release and put
it on its web site at the time of the public briefing. The next day, the
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three committee members briefed a major CDC advisory body in
Washington, DC. These arrangements appeared to work well: the
NAS-NRC report got a fair amount of media coverage, people in the
Hanford region and elsewhere seemed pleased, and there were no leaks.
Some of the NAS-NRC Committee's Major Findings
The NAS-NRC report presented a number of findings. Of the
major scientific ones, the committee found that the HTDS study
methods were of high quality, but it noted that considerable
uncertainties existed in some of the information. The committee felt
that the clinical examinations and laboratory studies were performed
with scientifically valid methods and that the investigators were correct
in emphasizing analyses of the radiation effect rather than comparisons
with another population. It did not think that comparing the HTDS
study group with some unexposed general population would be useful.
However, it was concerned that the results of the study were reported
- and interpreted - in black and white terms of whether a statistical
test was passed or failed. It recommended that confidence limits be
provided throughout the report to allow readers to judge how large a
radiation effect might be consistent with the data.
Importantly, the committee said the HTDS investigators probably
overstated the strength of their finding that there was no radiation
effect. The committee felt that the assumptions used by the
investigators to estimate the needed sample size and to calculate
statistical power were incorrect because they did not acknowledge that
exposures could be estimated only very imprecisely. This meant that
the ability of the study to detect a negative effect was decreased.
Responding to the first communication question posed by the
CDC about whether material in the HTDS draft report was accurate
and appropriate in providing guidance to the public in understanding
the study, the committee said that the written public materials and the
oral statements made by the FHCRC investigators were accurate in
representing what was in the draft report, but that they were sometimes
inappropriate and misleading because they overstated the certainty or
statistical power of the study and the conclusiveness of the negative
findings, while not reporting any of the uncertainties.
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Concerning the CDC's second communication question about how
revised messages should best be communicated to the public, the
committee noted that some revision had already occurred through
CDC efforts at public meetings in May 1999 and in other written
materials that made more of an effort to explain that no
epidemiological study could determine "whether an individual person's
thyroid disease is or is not caused by Hanford radiation exposure." 2 2
The committee recommended that a new detailed but flexible
communication plan be developed for the release of the final report. It
said it was imperative that messages from the final report take into
account the various audiences being addressed and show concern and
sensitivity for the people in the region who suffer from thyroid disease.
Any changes made to the draft final report must be clearly outlined
and explained, including why they were made, what group suggested
that they be made, and what impact they had had on the final results.
Every reasonable effort must be made, the committee said, to present
the full picture of the study results, including all the uncertainties and
other problems. It suggested that FHCRC and CDC personnel work
together on wording public messages about the final study findings, but
that different interpretations between the investigators and CDC
personnel should be offered to the public.
Responding to the final communication question posed by the
CDC about how to improve the release of future study reports, the
committee noted that trying to maintain a blackout during multiple
briefings - particularly in Washington, DC - is something that the
CDC should reconsider when a controversial report of great public
interest is involved. It recommended that the CDC simplify its briefing
procedure and that citizen groups who have long been involved in and
supportive of a study be given high priority in the briefing process. The
committee recommended that, if possible, one large briefing be
considered when releasing controversial reports, using satellite or less
expensive web transmission to reach all interested parties. It also
suggested sending out both draft and final reports a few days early to
journalists under an embargo so that the reporters could have a chance
22 Id.
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to read through these usually lengthy and technical reports and develop
informed questions.
Finally, the committee recommended that a workshop be held to
discuss the risk communication issues that arise with releasing
unreviewed draft reports to the public. The groups it recommended
inviting to such a workshop included experts in risk communication,
journalists, nongovernmental scientists who had worked on CDC
studies, and members of citizen groups who had served on CDC
advisory committees. It felt that while releasing draft scientific reports
may appear to serve the information needs of the public, this action also
has the potential to cause confusion and to undermine the credibility of
researchers and government agencies, particularly if well-publicized
findings of the draft are changed significantly in the final report. Of
course, keeping information from the public can also create serious
problems. The committee wanted the workshop group to evaluate the
advisability of publicly releasing draft reports before external peer
review and, because some releases of draft reports may be required by
law or contract, to develop suggestions on how to do so effectively.
However, developing such suggestions would be somewhat difficult
even if such a workshop were held. Much is still unknown about the
impact of draft reports. For example, how do audiences respond to
their release--do they perceive them as final information? How do
members of the public use and respond to risk-related messages in draft
reports? Do they act on them? How should government agencies
discuss levels of scientific uncertainties in draft reports? Are there
alternative ways in draft reports of addressing public concerns about
highly controversial health issues such as the Hanford site and thyroid
disease?
The HTDS situation has shown that releasing draft reports about
important and controversial health issues without external peer review
adds another dimension to the complexity that is inherent in risk
communication. Given the increasing tendency of government agencies
to release draft reports, it is important for members of the risk
communication community to contemplate the issues that this practice
brings to our field.
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